Beyond discipline:Discipline and lenience in religious practice. Introduction. by Mayblin, Maya & Malara, Diego Maria
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond discipline
Citation for published version:
Mayblin, M & Malara, DM 2018, 'Beyond discipline: Discipline and lenience in religious practice.
Introduction.', Social Analysis , vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 1-20. https://doi.org/10.3167/sa.2018.620301
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.3167/sa.2018.620301
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Social Analysis
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a post–peer-review, precopyedited version of an article published in Social Analysis. The definitive
publisher-authenticated version Mayblin, M., & Malara, D. (2018). Introduction, Social Analysis, 62(3), 1-20. is
available online at: https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/social-analysis/62/3/sa620301.xml
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Sep. 2020
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Beyond Discipline: Discipline and Lenience in Religious Practice.
Introduction.
Citation for published version:
Mayblin, M & Malara, DM 2018, 'Beyond Discipline: Discipline and Lenience in Religious Practice.
Introduction.' Social Analysis .
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Social Analysis
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Jun. 2018
 1 
Beyond Discipline: Discipline and Lenience in the study of religion.  
Introduction  
 
Authors: Maya Mayblin & Diego Maria Malara 
 
Questions of discipline – both discipline of others and self-discipline – matter today as much 
as they ever did. Airport bookshelves are crammed with books selling us discipline: 
techniques enabling us to ‘do more’, techniques enabling us ‘do less’. Discourses of exertion 
and relaxation, of will power and self-abstention, come at us from a bewildering number of 
angles. Discipline, it would seem, is thus no less ubiquitous, no less penetrating, no less a 
driver of subjectivity than when under Foucault’s famous gaze. But how much do social 
scientists assume when they place discipline at the centre of subjecthood? If selves can be 
mastered, can they also be unmastered? And what sorts of ends would un-mastering, or even 
a simple absence of discipline serve? The question and central contribution of this special 
section is to reappraise discipline by training a lens on its counterpart: lenience. The term 
lenience is defined by the Oxford English dictionary as the ‘fact or quality of being more 
merciful or tolerant than expected’. Yet, it might also be thought of as a fact or quality of 
plasticity or flexibility. As a noun lenience denotes a loosening or lessening of something, 
normally some chore, practice, or punishment; but this does not necessarily make it stand for 
a lack. On the contrary, lenience can signal a forceful presence; as some of its numerous 
synonyms indicate, it can manifest as an overflowing or a positive charge: tolerance, mercy, 
clemency, grace, kindness, and compassion. Whatever lenience is, it presents us, we suggest, 
with a rich seam for thinking more deeply about discipline, whether as concept or as a 
practice which has particular material effects on the world.  
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Although there are clearly so many areas of life in which questions of discipline and lenience 
would apply, the essays of this special section all explore the topic from the vantage point of 
religion. The anthropology of religion has a long and fertile history for intellectual 
discussions of discipline, particularly in relation to projects of piety, ethics, and selfhood. 
Thus, it provides a well-elaborated field of debate to which explorations of ‘lenience’ may be 
interposed. Lenience abounds, we only have to look for it. What, we ask, would a diffuse, 
widespread, or contained but intensive failure to live ‘according to the rules’ mean for 
religious institutions if lenience were not part of their armoury? How would religious 
traditions resist the stresses and strains of contradiction and idiosyncrasy if certain agreed 
strategies for dealing with negative (or anti-traditional) forces were not in play? Although a 
good deal of important discussion has already occurred on questions of ‘doubt’ and 
experiences of ‘failure’ in religious contexts, in much of this literature the focus remains on 
‘contingency’ and its effects, or on the reflexive capacities by which individuals deal with 
religious failure1.         
 
In this introductory essay, however, we are interested in failure at the level of the collective – 
failure that would not be ‘contingent’ because it has, in some form or other, already been 
foreseen and collectively dealt with. In other words, we seek to explore what ‘lenience’ adds 
to a contemporary anthropology of ethics and religion, by looking at the sorts of questions it 
invites us to ask about religion in the grandest sociological sense. Not enough attention has 
been given, we feel, to the distance vantage point. Thus we ask what happens when we ‘scale 
up’ and approach religion, not simply from the viewpoint of individual interlocutors, but as a 
largescale social system, which reproduces itself successfully because, on various 
interconnecting levels, it is able to contain its own failure. As Joel Robbins and Leanne 
                                                
1 For a thorough review of this debate see Kloos and Beekers 2018. 
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Williams Green suggest, the notion of failure as sin is central to the very idea of Christianity: 
‘without it, Christianity would not have the shape it has; it would not define salvation in the 
ways it does nor would it make salvation central to its definition of religious purpose’ 
(2018:21). Failure in the form of sinfulness is, to put it another way, part of Christianity’s 
DNA: a basic, and structuring principle. With this special section, our focus is on ‘scaling 
up’, using ethnography to illustrate ‘systems’ which can only be properly perceived at a more 
distant theoretical remove. We propose lenience, not as an opposite to discipline, but as a 
way to a sharpen our understanding, not simply of agency, power-relations, and ethics, but of 
how ethics creates systems that are experienced, in some sense, as ‘holistic’ and intellectually 
coherent, and/or that can be objectified as veritable entities (such as a Church, or a seminary) 
with discernible boundaries and functions in the world. 2 
 
If ‘scaling up’ is one conscious goal of this introductory essay, a second is to question certain 
tendencies in the literature that has otherwise inspired us. The first tendency concerns a 
pattern of resorting to capitalist metaphors of profit and productivity when describing failure: 
failure and doubt have a tendency to be described as ‘productive,’ or as ‘grounds for action’. 
Linked in some ways to the first, another trend we aim to question is a creeping propensity 
for social theories around ethics and failure to draw heavily on the sorts of logics produced 
by religions of the world-renouncing variety, and particularly the Abrahamic traditions. On 
this point, it is worth noting that what many of the authors in this broader literature have in 
common are ethnographic field-sites in which reformist versions of Islam and Christianity are 
dominant. However, as Diana Espirito Santo’s essay for this special section reveals, in many 
alternative religious traditions (particularly in non-monotheistic and non-world renouncing 
                                                
2 In this we are partially indebted to scholars such as Talcott Parsons (1954) and Niklas 
Luhmann (2006; 2012) whose influential thinking on ‘systems’ remains provocative food for 
contemporary anthropological theory . 
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forms of practice) we discover models of personhood radically different from the inward-
looking, hyper-reflexive ‘selves’ examined in many contemporary studies of religion and 
ethics. 
  
Discipline, Lenience: on the scale of the question 
 
Our ability to identify discipline as a topic and our proposal to explore it here is indebted, in 
the first instance, to a rather impressive body of thinking on the subject inspired by Michel 
Foucault (e.g. Asad 1993; Hirschkind 2006; Faubion 2001, 2012; Laidlaw 1995, 2002; 
Mahmood 2001, 2003, 2005). In ‘Discipline and Punish’ (1975), Foucault introduced the idea 
of ‘disciplinary techniques’ – practices which molded modern subjects, normalizing practices 
which made individuals complicit with extant relations of power. Institutional power was 
revealed to be the product of new forms of bodily and spatial control, which relied on 
increasingly sophisticated regimes of visibility. Foucault’s later works on ethics marked a 
shift of focus from ‘discipline’ to ideas of ‘self-care’ and ‘freedom’. In this later period, 
Foucault, now seeking to understand self-discipline and self-governance, investigated 
techniques whereby ‘the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the 
self’, following procedural regimes which are not ‘invented by the individual himself’, but 
rather ‘models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed on him by 
his culture, his society, or social group’ (1997: 291).       
 
In ‘Sexualities’, Foucault (1979) turned productively to the history of Western Christianity, 
to show how ‘care of the self’ became progressively geared around dissection of the interior-
self, as exemplified by ritual technologies like confession and penance. This led to new types 
of apprehension around the ‘desirous self’: the self, seen ‘increasingly as a self with secret 
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desires - paradigmatically and most persistently sexual desires’ (Laidlaw 2002: 325; see 
Foucault 1997). Anxieties about the legibility of the ‘desirous self’ and its murky depths 
called for systematic self-monitoring which brought new subjects into being and, in turn, 
presaged the development of modern psychoanalytical regimes. Discipline, in the form of 
self-discipline, was arguably the central and defining concerns of Foucault’s oeuvre on 
governmentality, and the analytical language he bequeathed to social thought brought about 
an axial shift in the way anthropologists sought to understand the world (see Foucault 2000). 
Certainly, within the anthropology of religion such a shift opened the way to ever-finer 
documentation of modes of self-fashioning –generating particular discussion of the formation 
of the subject’s interiority – and has led to what has become widely known as the 
anthropology of ethics. 
 
For Laidlaw, a turn to ethics heralds an important move away from crude sociological models 
which posit human action as the ‘mechanical self-reproduction of “objective structures”’ 
(2014: 10). The claim on which the anthropology of ethics rests is, he posits, a descriptive 
one: that lived values are, in essence, conflictive, and humans evaluative. ‘Actually living a 
life’, he writes: 
 
‘requires doing so with reference to values that make conflicting demands, and 
managing the inherently irresolvable tensions between them. . . . A form of life 
such as this then, which answers to diverse and conflicting values, must needs be 
lived as something more internally complex and ironic than the execution of a 
consistent project and the achievement of a self-consistent moral will, and this is 
true even of a people who accept and articulate just such a self-representation.’ 
(Laidlaw 2014: 169)  
 6 
 
This makes for what many anthropologists are now calling ‘ethical processes’, the continual 
unfolding-into-the-world of interior complexity. It could be claimed that the ‘anthropology of 
ethics’, in its various forms, has succeeded the study of disciplinary structures – at least in so 
far as discipline is understood, apropos of Foucault, to index a type of ethical feedback loop 
between shared values, individual interiority, and physical conduct.  
 
Laidlaw’s greatest inspiration for laying down an anthropology of ethics and freedom were 
Indian Jains. Jains find themselves born into a religious system of extreme asceticism. To live 
a life completely in synch with Jain ideals would be, in their own terms, ‘impossible’. As 
such there are lay Jains (householders) and ascetic Jains (world renouncers), and these 
constitute differing paths. Householders resign themselves to the sins of being in this world, 
their only positive remit being to venerate, protect and materially support the ones who 
renounce it (Laidlaw 1995). The Jain example is rich for thinking through matters of 
lenience. The social expectation is, we are told, for extreme self-discipline; but a sliding scale 
of toleration for those who circumvent the rules allows the majority of householders off the 
hook. For Laidlaw, the most productive way of looking at what it means to be a lay Jain is in 
terms of ethics because ‘ethical considerations are pervasive on the surface of human social 
life’ (2014: 3). In short: ‘The only way even to begin to make sense of what it might be to be 
a good lay Jain, is to be reflectively, unquestioningly, and uncomfortably conscious that one 
is not living. . . . sanely in one’s world at all’ (ibid.: 128). 
 
Be that as it may, the Jain example gives rise to a very particular experience of moral 
discomfort because the system as whole has lenience built into it. Jains have recourse to the 
category of ‘householder’ with its attendant rules and psychological comforts. This 
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elaborated category is not invented afresh by each Jain individual; it is already in existence 
and constitutes an acceptable – if less perfect – pathway of discovery. Rituals of cleansing 
and purification that work continually to mitigate the worst of aspects of pollution might also 
be looked at in such a way (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994). To claim, then, that Jainism 
constitutes a ‘system’ with a certain degree of lenience built into it is not, ipso facto, a claim 
that Jains are, individually, reflexive subjects.3 The former is a claim about a ‘system’ that is, 
to academic intents and purposes, an abstraction; while the latter is a claim about the nature 
of first-person experience. The position we advocate is not a giving up of what we know 
about the world from the first person perspective, it is simply about being open to vantage 
points or theoretical formations that, in combination with detailed ethnography, can help us to 
‘know’ things differently. This ‘getting to know’ things differently by attending both to the 
macro and the micro has arguably always been needed for anthropological analysis.4  
 
What systemic vantage points tend to reveal is the often taken-for-granted fact that systems 
exist because of divisions of labour. In religious systems where a clerical or priestly caste is 
defined, ‘ethics’ in the form of intellectual reflexivity or a heightened sensitivity to the 
presence of moral contradiction can also be thought about as labour divided across differing 
categories of people (cf. Bandak & Boylston 2014; Khan Forthcoming; Laidlaw 1995; 
Malara & Boylston 2016; Mayblin 2017). Actual divisions of ethical labour may not map 
perfectly onto formal designation (i.e. perhaps the most reflexive subjects in a given system 
are not the priests or the ritual specialists). In other religious systems, ethical process might 
                                                
3 Equally, the claim that Jains are reflexive subjects is not necessarily a claim that they are so 
in the absence of a ‘system’. As Heywood (2015) has argued in his discussion of Doppia 
Morale (double morality) in Italy, the anthropology of ethics does not necessarily require us 
to understand freedom as the absence of constraint. 
4 Examinations of this topic have a long pedigree within the social sciences. For interesting 
overviews, see: Schelling 1978; Evens and Handleman 2005 plus essays within that special 
issue; and Faulk Moore 1987.  
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be spread more evenly among individuals as, for instance, in societies where individuality, 
interiority, and sincerity have come to be highly valued (see Keane 2007). And yet, even in 
these more ‘equally spread’ contexts it may well be that, from a systemic vantage point, 
intensities of ethical labor remain unevenly distributed (see Malara in this volume).  
            
In recent literature on failure and imperfection in ‘lived’, ‘ambivalent’, or ‘everyday’ religion 
(e.g. Fahy 2017; Marsden 2009; Oustinova-Stjepanovic 2017; Schielke & Debevec 2012; 
Schielke 2009a, 2009b), the possibility that ethics is a process with unevenly distributed 
intensities is barely elaborated. This may be, in part, because systemic vantage points have 
become somewhat unfashionable, but it is also an effect of the fact that accounts of ethical 
equivocation have become a much larger part of the written ethnographic landscape. 
Ethnographies work by zooming in on the messy, processual manner in which individuals 
strive and achieve a sense of ‘religious meaning’ (Engelke & Tomlinson 2006); they provide 
close-up views of the disruptive, but often surprisingly invigorating effects of ‘accidents’ and 
‘contingencies’ on moral worlds. As such, what a good deal of recent anthropological work 
on ethics has provided us with are fine-grained accounts of disciplinary hiccups, moments of 
weakness, and failures of willpower from the first-person perspective. Out of this we have 
achieved a detailed picture of ‘how senses of failure invigorate lived religion’ (Kloos & 
Beekers 2018).  In much of this literature, failure is imminently redeemable, in so far as it 
fosters desires for perfection, or propels higher moral yearnings. Kloos, for example, 
critiques Debevec, for describing her Muslim interlocutor’s ‘postponement’ of prayer and 
piety merely as a negotiation ‘complex’ lives, and argues instead that not-praying should be 
approached as an ethical mode, and therefore as something which ‘contributes to personal, 
lifelong and often unpredictable processes of ethical improvement’ (2018: 94). He clarifies 
his position as ‘part of a broader trend in anthropology to study expressions of uncertainty, 
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doubt and imperfection as grounds for action’ (ibid.).      
     
While we have no argument with the widely documented finding that humans respond to 
failure and obstacles with remarkable reflexivity, and are therefore adept at transforming 
stumbling blocks into productive pathways of moral and philosophical reflection, we would 
question the view that failure necessarily demands taxing ethical work or that it inevitably 
results in ‘grounds for action’. On this point, it is worth noting that what many of the authors 
in the broader trend to view failure as grounds for action have in common are, again, 
ethnographic fieldsites in which reformist versions of Abrahamic religions are dominant. 
This risks leaving a particular kind of dent in the topology of contemporary social theory. 
Webb Keane (2007) and Adam Seligman (2010) have shown that what we normally call the 
‘modern’ period is one in which sincerity claims have been given a rare institutional and 
cultural emphasis (and this is particularly the case in reformist or revivalist versions of 
Christianity and Islam). The dent in the topology of social theory is thus, we contend, 
‘sincerity shaped’.  
     
When we look to other cultural and religious contexts – in particular to subjects engaged with 
religious traditions that are not monotheistic or essentially world renouncing – we find 
models of personhood and concepts of ‘self’ radically different from those suggested by 
contemporary anthropological reflection on ethics and religion. As Espirito-Santo’s paper 
serves to show, the Palo sense of self is, by definition, a fragment in a constant state of 
assemblage and re-assemblage, incorporating shifting, unstable proportions of human and 
non-human, spirit and matter both internal and external to the subject. And, insofar as this 
type of unbounded self is constituted differently from the classical Foucauldian subject, it 
gives rise to very different sets of theoretical questions. The Palo ‘self’ is subjectable to truth 
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claims and power-relations, but subjectable to them in radically different ways from the 
Christian or Islamic subject. For the Cuban Paleros described by Espirito Santo, the desired 
telos of efforts at disciplining the self and its relationships with the world is not moral 
perfection so much as a life unencumbered by witchcraft and illness. As in many 
recognizable ethnographic contexts, being struck down by witchcraft is not processed as 
moral failure, nor does being a victim of witchcraft reflect anything particular about one’s 
inner state. As such, although addressing witchcraft attack through specialized Palo ritual is 
an action requiring creativity and intellect, it does not shore up any hidden, ongoing and 
singular project of personal moral improvement.  
 
An article by Bloch on ritual modes of illocution as ‘quotation’ provides an instructive 
example of some of the wider implications of the point made above, and is worth examining 
here. Bloch foregrounds the concept of deference to account for those situations in which 
heightened reflexivity, awareness of one’s intentionality and the alignment between social 
actions and interior states are somewhat bracketed (cf. Keane 2007). As he writes, ‘The 
ordinary continual deference of practical life does not simply involve delaying our search for 
intentionality, but often apparently largely abandoning it’ (Bloch 2004:127). The social 
mechanics of deference are particularly relevant to the systemic view of religion we have 
proposed. For instance, in those institutional settings where there exists a clear division of 
religious labour – intellectual, theological, ethical or otherwise – we can discern more clearly 
the dynamics of the socio-cultural regulation of ‘Situations when the truth of certain 
propositions is to be accepted through deference, and therefore not necessarily understood’ 
(ibid.). In such contexts, practitioners are more likely to renounce the role of authoritative, 
critical actor by deferring to ‘the ancestors’, doing only ‘what was done in the past,’ or 
looking to other authoritative religious figures for interpretative guidance (see also Laidlaw 
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1994). Deference, as Bandak and Boylston point out, is both a matter of ‘acquiescing to 
authority or putting the issue off in time’ (2014: 34), by, for instance, leaving an ethical 
question temporarily unaddressed in order to continue living life relatively unencumbered by 
it. Attempts to grasp the workings of lenience within complex religious systems, we suggest, 
need to account for, on the one hand, these strategies of suspension and deferral and, on the 
other, for what Bloch identifies as ‘moments when there are not only limits to understanding, 
but limits to the appropriateness of attempting to understand’ (2004: 127). 
 
In contrast to the continuous demands of heightened reflexivity imposed on religious subjects 
in certain traditions, in a number of religious systems, deference and deferral are necessary 
for the system to reproduce itself and might, as such, be viewed as technologies of lenience. 
Bandak and Boylston’s take on deference and deferral within Orthodoxy illustrates our point 
succinctly:  
 
For a relatively fixed, institutional doctrine to apply to everyone, that doctrine 
must be sufficiently flexible in its application to encounter a wide range of 
situations without being invalidated. It must also be able to cope with a certain 
degree of deviation on the part of its members, clergy and laity alike. Otherwise, 
orthodoxies would become inapplicable to present circumstances. . . . [W]hat 
many people consider a proper moral life seems impossibly far off, and in these 
circumstances adhering to some of the formal tenets of the Church provides a root 
of belonging while keeping open the possibility of becoming a better Christian in 
the future . . . . A formal ritual framework provides these orientation points 
without encompassing the whole lives of the faithful or . . . . steering them to 
making assertive statements that they will then be compelled to contradict. The 
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formal structures of the Church persist even if priests fail their flock (Bandak & 
Boylston 2014: 34-35). 
While we shall return to the issue of ‘structural flexibility’ and its broader implications later, 
here we wish only to call for a finer appreciation of the manner in which individuals trust in, 
defer to, and depend upon one another as members of a same religious collective (see Malara 
and Reinhardt in this volume). In other words, we need a more refined understanding of 
discipline’s relation to lenience as well as of the varied relational operations that lenience 
affords. 
         
Although some of the essays in this section draw productively on Foucault’s oeuvre in order 
to unpack the dialectics of discipline and within projects of religious pedagogy (Reinhardt), 
others caution us against a-priori assumptions that subjectivity is necessarily to be understood 
within the parameters of a Foucauldian framework. What all the contributions to this section 
do, however, is challenge us to think about lenience – whether as ‘fluidity’ (Espirito Santo), 
as ‘relational economy’ (Malara), or as ‘degrees’ of spiritual maturity – in a range of abstract 
and concrete ways that take us beyond first-person narratives. We hereby echo Keane’s view 
that the most thought-provoking insights of anthropology do not derive simply from the first-
person perspective, but rather ‘from ongoing movement back and forth between intimacy and 
the more distant view of the third person’ (2014: 447). Taking ethics seriously, argues Keane, 
would not mean taking people only at face value and resting content with an account of 
subjectivities, for, it would mean thinking ‘dispassionately’ about ‘the sources and 
consequences of self-deception, blindness, and distortions’ (ibid).  
 
If we are to accept that ‘self-deception’, ‘blindness’, and ‘deference’ are as necessary for 
social systems to function as sincerity, meaning, and coherence, we need to remain mindful 
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that academic analyses of doubt, ambiguity, and failure as ultimately productive may be only 
one link in the crystalline organization of a given social structure. Scaling upwards, we might 
find that ‘failing well’ as a first-person account driven by distinct ethical scripts gives way to 
‘systemic lenience’ which - even if it overlaps with first-person accounts -  only comes 
sharply into focus when viewed from afar. Systemic lenience may incorporate spaces in 
which failure can be compartmentalized, via logics of deference or, even, self-deception. 
However, it is worth noting that this is not a complete turn away from human reflexivity, nor 
is it a denial that failure can generate ‘action’; it is merely a way of remaining attentive to the 
possibilities of ‘blindness’ and inaction. A turn to lenience, then, opens our analyses up to a 
greater variety of systemic patterns and their concatenating effects.  
 
 
Tropes and technologies of lenience and their systemic functions 
 
In this special section, we want to move away from Foucault’s expansive notion of 
discipline-as-subject-formation, in order to see the criss-cross of affects and associations 
contained within that English word. As a folk concept discipline is often much narrower in 
scope. Associated with punishment, a discipline is, even if self-imposed, ‘punishing’ and 
therefore on some level – no matter how small and seemingly invisible that level – unpleasant 
in some way. Putting it crudely, we could say that if there is no pull of unpleasantness in 
whatever act or thought or word we are calling ‘disciplinary’ it isn’t really discipline. If a 
person had an innate love of freezing cold showers (i.e. they did not need to learn to like cold 
showers), then taking cold showers could never be a discipline for them. Their daily regime 
of cold showers could not really be called a ‘regime’ – it would be more accurate to call it an 
indulgence. Taking several cold showers a day? For that person it would be a vice. At the 
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most basic level, to speak of discipline in these terms is to speak of experience that is 
cognitively, emotionally or physically taxing of human energy. The fact of the matter is that 
although disciplines promise eventual ease, that ease is always future-oriented. We need 
discipline to plant in us habits, but once a habit has taken root we are, again, at ease. In the 
actual moment, not looking to some future point, a discipline is not the same as a habit. A 
discipline requires more energy than a habit, and it seems to sap us in certain ways that are 
hard to define.  
 
If human life involves myriads of ‘pleasant actions’ and ‘taxing actions’ – the intensity of 
taxing/pleasant we are actually talking about will vary for every person – it is clearly from 
this complex palette that interior subjectivity emerges. Yet, this does not necessarily make 
subjectivity the ‘unmoved mover’ of all social life, as it is clear that in addition to willpower 
and effort, human energy can be ‘caused’ and ‘curtailed’ by forces external to the self. 
Heavily ideational notions of discipline can therefore only take us so far. To speak of 
disciplinary systems is to speak of a multiplicity of qualities and effects, which are all, in 
some ways, interdependent on one another – from the harshness of punishments to the 
‘looseness’ of laziness or the ‘lessening’ of mercy. However, it is to lenience in particular 
that this special section is particularly dedicated. The importance of lenience as a quality is 
particularly clear if we look to the laws of physics and to the different kinds of potential 
afforded by various physical materials. As a proxy for lenience we might think, for a 
moment, about flexibility as a desired property in the world of structural engineering. It is 
well known, for example, that the more flexible a structure is, the less energy required to 
keep it from toppling or collapsing under force and movement. A person can feel this same 
phenomenon while riding a bus or train standing up. It requires less effort to stay upright if 
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you flex your body, leaning into the bumps and jolts, than if you stiffly try to defy them.  
        
Remaining for a moment with mechanical principles it is interesting to note that structural 
engineers tasked with building earthquake resistant structures pay a good deal of attention to 
the ductility of materials. When engineers speak of ductility they mean the pliability of a 
substance, the ease with which it may be pulled, temporarily, into other shapes. Ductility is 
necessary for the absorption and dispersal of stress from outside sources. Structural engineers 
sometimes incorporate what are known as ‘moment-resisting frames’ into buildings: frames 
in which the columns and beams are allowed to bend, but the joints or connectors between 
them are rigid. Lead-rubber bearings would provide an alternative option: the lead core 
makes the bearing stiff and strong in the vertical direction, while the rubber and steel bands 
make the bearing flexible in the horizontal direction. Simply put, the safety of large physical 
structures rests on a mixture of rigidity and flexibility. Columns that have ‘give’, buildings 
that have ‘sway’.            
 
The importance of lenience in the overall materiality of a building may be counter-intuitive to 
normal understandings of buildings (as hard, unyielding concrete-like structures) or at least 
invisible from certain viewpoints. But this does not mean that lenience is not an important 
quality. As Talcott Parsons long ago identified: 
 
Every social system is a functioning entity. That is, it is a system of 
interdependent structures and processes such that it tends to maintain a relative 
stability and distinctiveness of pattern and behaviour as an entity by contrast 
with its - social or other - environment, and with it a relative independence from 
environmental forces. It "responds", to be sure, to the environmental stimuli, but 
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is not completely assimilated to its environment, maintaining rather an element 
of distinctiveness in the face of variations in environmental conditions. (1954: 
143) 
 
Parsons description of ‘social systems’ as ‘interdependent structures and processes’ may 
seem somewhat old-fashioned, but it points to the fact that social life is always, in part, a 
response to ‘environmental stimuli’. And thus, if thinking through the ‘moment-resisting 
frame’ gives us some purchase on the function of flexibility in the physical world, thinking 
about the work of the seismic engineer shows how lenience – whether as principle, as 
property, or effect – is present in otherwise rigid and unyielding systems all around us 
(religious or otherwise). In his many reflections on informal economies, James Scott takes the 
notion of lenience in an interesting direction by observing how in any office or factory, work 
‘cannot be adequately explained by the rules, however elaborate, governing it’ (2014: 46). 
The smooth running of any system, he insists, means bending the rules; in other words, 
demanding lenience of them. One example Scott provides concerns the Parisian taxi drivers 
who, whenever they were frustrated with the municipal authorities over fees or new 
regulations, would resort to the ‘work-to-rule’ strike (greve de zèle) by, on cue, collectively 
following all the regulations in the code routièr (traffic laws), thereby bringing the traffic in 
Paris to a grinding halt (ibid.: 46). What the effects of a ‘work-to-rule’ strike point to is the 
sheer dependence of complex systems on different levels of openness to discipline.  In order 
to successfully reproduce themselves, systems  – whether they are organic, mechanical, 
social, or structural – need to incorporate leniency at some level. By using the example of the 
greve de zele, Scott gives us the systemic vantage point. Lenience only becomes apparent as a 
functioning property with causal effects on the world (its allows for the smooth flow of 
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traffic) when we abstract the city and consider it as a system.5    
     
All the same, lenience tends to be more emphasised, the more exacting the overall 
disciplinary regime. For an example of this, we might look to the popular money 
management website: ‘You Need a Budget’ (YNAB). YNAB is a multi-platform personal 
budgeting program which helps people to know and therefore better control every single 
penny that passes through their account. Although basically tied up with the purchase of 
software, YNAB is extremely popular as a budgeting philosophy based on ‘four rules’ which, 
if followed faithfully, are meant to help people achieve difficult financial goals: save up for a 
house, pay off a car, eradicate all debt. The system involves extreme self-discipline and 
constant awareness: being meticulously intentional about where one’s money is going; saving 
on a regular basis (no matter how small the amount saved), and keeping a rigorous account of 
every penny spent. But, in the process of creating such budgets, YNABers are strongly 
advised to build in some slack, as it were. Committed YNABers report often on the 
importance of factoring lenience into one’s budget on Internet threads. This takes the form of 
treating oneself to small frivolities on a regular basis such as a bunch of flowers once a week, 
a Starbucks coffee every now and then – whatever your frivolity may be. A person who does 
not do this is much less likely to go the long term with their budget keeping. Make the rules 
too strict and you set yourself up for failure; better to build lenience into one’s financial flow 
or, more significantly, better to preventively take control of failure than to let failure control 
you. What we find noteworthy here, what we think makes this truly systemic, is the idea that 
large-scale failure can be averted by premeditating smaller-scale failures. A principle of 
inoculation is somehow involved: prevention of the illness involves exposure to the virus. By 
                                                
5 For a more sustained discussion of systems theory, see Luhmann 2012. 
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indulging one’s ‘weakness’ for Starbucks every so often one turns it into something 
legitimate and predictable, and weakness writ large is successfully contained.  
 
As the YNAB example suggests, elaborated disciplinary regimes at once produce, and are 
reproduced by lenient moments allowing for the loosening and lessening of taxing demands. 
Mary Douglas’ seminal formulation of group and grid theory provides a useful 
anthropological antecedent to the observation that the different overall intensities of certain 
qualities in systems (acephalousness or hieararchy, for example) map onto different levels of 
elaboration and cultural ornamentation of lenience. Although her theory is articulated in 
significantly different ways in various texts (see Douglas 1978, 1982), Douglas identified two 
broad analytical dimensions or axis on which typologies of social organization can be plotted. 
The group dimension refers to the degree of incorporation of individuals within communities’ 
boundaries and measures the extent to which the lives of social actors is constrained by the 
group due to their mere belonging. The grid dimension measures the amount of social control 
that group members accept. At the opposite end of the grid’s incremental axis, one 
encounters highly hierarchical societies with comprehensive, stringent regulations and social 
groups where social obligations are less prominent, being negotiated on more of an ad hoc 
basis. The link with our interest in lenience is particularly evident in Douglas’ discussion of 
the relation between constraints and group boundaries: ‘At one end of the scale you are a 
member of a religious group though you only turn up on Sundays, or perhaps annually. At the 
other end there are groups such as convents and monasteries which demand full-time, life-
time, commitment’ (Douglas 2006:3). While a discussion of the types of social organizations 
placed along grid and group axes is beyond the scope of this introduction, the papers in this 
volume contribute to a novel theorisation of the variegated spectrum of religious systems 
within which flexibility and lenience – and flexibility as lenience – might be more or less 
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conspicuous, required, contested or desirable. In other words, they invite us to remain 
attentive to the possible differences between and diverse effects of lenient disciplines versus 
disciplined leniencies. 
 
As we noted, by training a lens on lenience via discipline, we can better attend to failures and 
deviations that are, to varying degrees, preempted by the social systems in which they are 
embedded – and which, therefore, allow for a smooth flow of action. That is, we are less 
interested in problems of contingency per se, and more in identifying spaces in which 
disciplinary breakdowns have been anticipated and any fall-out therefore mitigated. The 
distinction is a subtle but important one: contingent disruption versus premeditated failure. 
Lenience as we find it in the papers that follow is brought into focus in various ways: as the 
foundational flexibility of cosmos and selfhood (Espirito-Santo); as the ‘loosely controlled 
periphery’ of a highly organized Ghanaian denomination (Reinhart); and as the embodied 
processes whereby Ethiopian Orthodox Christians ‘balance out’ iniquities in ascetic practice 
(Malara). In two of the ethnographic contexts looked at here (Reinhart and Malara), lenience 
encompasses a discourse or practice, intentionally carved into a systemic arrangement, 
thereby containing and taming the dangers of moral transgression. In the third contribution to 
this section, lenience – in the form of plasticity – emerges more in the guise of an ontological 
principle. Rather than being described by Espirito-Santo as a kind of technology designed to 
contain, absorb, or sublimate transgression, lenience as ontological flexibility constitutes the 
very essence of persons. It is only because the Palo person is, by nature, a fluid and de-
centered entity, constantly creating and recreating itself in terms of its physical, metaphysical 
and spiritual boundaries, that it is both vulnerable to, and able to solve the kinds of problems 
that beset it.  
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All the same, systemic explorations that shore lenience up as, in some way, effective at 
problem solving should not distract us from noticing when lenience encounters its limits. In 
other words, just as lenience gives rise to ethics, so it can entail its own kind of politics. As 
Mayblin (2017) has described, extreme technologies of lenience in the form of Catholic 
indulgences allowed for a kind of social elasticity and institutional growth throughout the late 
Middle Ages which might otherwise have been impossible. And yet, the incredible leniency 
provided by indulgences was not, we know today, infinite. By 1517, the level of lenience (or 
economic convenience) that the indulgence seemed to proffer was found, by many, to be too 
extreme and this pushed the system (in this case the Catholic Church) into a profound state of 
instability and crisis. Along came the Protestant Reformation, causing the fragmentation of 
that particular system. Many of the new denominations that emerged in the wake of the 
schism, rejected the system of indulgences; and, although the Catholic Church did not cancel 
its underpinnings, by 1567 the papacy had banned the sale of indulgences. In this context, 
then, it can be said that lenience went too far, triggering centuries of bottled up anger against 
the clergy to overflow, and producing both qualitative and quantitative changes to the system. 
To speak of religious systems is thus to speak of complex dynamic entities that are always 
historically situated and never entirely ‘finished’. In other words, systems are responsive but 
not, in themselves, ‘ethical’. The effects of ‘systems’ on people may trigger and engage 
human modes of reflexivity – but human reflexivity is only ever one of several ‘moving 
parts’ in a system. Other, intercalated ‘parts’ may produce effects via ‘mechanical’ modes of 
being-in-the-world. To speak of ‘systems’ is thus to embrace multiple modes of being-in-the-
world, all, in some ways, interdependent on one another.   
 
The essays 
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The papers in this volume give us a sense of the wide gamut in which discipline is played out 
and articulated in a number of very different traditions beyond the Catholic Church. But, 
more importantly, this ethnographic panoramic aims to provocatively raise the question of 
how technologies of lenience operate in (and outside) the realm of religiosity and what their 
relevance is to our understanding of power, discipline and complex organizations. 
 
Drawing on research conducted among Ethiopian Orthodox residents of Addis Ababa, 
Malara’s article asks what religious discipline looks like for people who take Christianity 
seriously, but are not necessarily assiduous church-goers or even, as they see it, ‘good 
Christians’. Shifting the focus from the cloister to the city, from the pious to the non-
churchgoer – in contrast with studies focusing on individuals and groups whose religious life 
is characterized by virtuosity, commitment, and zealous activism – Malara interrogates the 
salience of fasting to the religious lives of ordinary urban Christians. Such a shift brings to 
light a division of religious labour whereby less disciplined fasting subjects may still access 
the ‘blessing’ produced by others in a relational economy of spiritual care. This division of 
labour allows for a variety of ethical stances, not all of which transform moral inadequacy 
into something productive or regenerative, such as a resolution to ‘do better’. Rather, for 
certain individuals who are unable or unwilling to live up to the highest disciplinary 
standards, moral inadequacy can be relativized with reference to different encompassing 
frames – such as one’s time in the overall life-cycle, or when in the religious year, with its 
inbuilt seasons of lenience and carnal enjoyment alternated to those of fasting and 
repentance. By re-situating anthropological discussions of discipline around the routine 
management of imperfection, Malara reveals how an intricate tapestry of intimate 
relationships produces systemic leniency. Strong relational links between those who do not 
fast fully and pious individuals who are ‘fasting for others’ ensures that in any given period 
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of fasting, enough overall fasting, is achieved. In this context, in which spiritual intercession 
is a central feature, disciplinary labour is essentially other-oriented, prompting Malara to ask 
if the anthropological fascination for ‘technologies of the self’ might be obscuring the 
relevance of ‘technologies of the others’. In the Ethiopian case, it is precisely the disciplined 
‘technologies of others’ that ‘balances out’ the absence of discipline at the level of the self.  
 
Similar concerns find echo in Reinhardt’s contribution, which takes the problem of lenience 
as an opportunity to rethink religious discipline ‘beyond the self’. Rather than contrasting 
lenience and its related themes – such as the contingency of religious lives – to discipline, 
Reinhardt highlights their dialectical entanglements within normative projects, showing us 
how religious pedagogy works from the point of view of the broader organization and 
community of practice large Pentecostal-charismatic Ghanaian denomination. The 
Lighthouse Chapel International (LCI) recognizes the multiple levels of commitment that 
characterize its membership, as well as the diverse motivations that lead its members to stray 
from expected paths of behavior and uses lenience to deflect it. Here, disciplinary ‘misfire’, 
far from being an unusual or extra-normative part of the LCI system, is very much a part of 
it. Misfire works as a kind of hinge articulating two relatively autonomous teloi of 
Pentecostal Christianity: an evangelistic and quantitative concern with ‘church growth’, and 
an apostolic and qualitative concern with ‘spiritual maturity’. Lenience manifests as an 
expression of phronesis or situated judgment – a theme explored from a different angle in 
Malara’s paper – as it calibrates disciplinary demands according to the converts’ level of 
‘spiritual maturity’. The point in this, members of the LCI say, is not to ‘scare the sheep 
away’. By operating as an organizational principle in LCI, phronesis engenders a specific 
institutional design: a version of the visible ‘body of Christ’ with very loosely controlled 
peripheries but with a defined and highly structured center (the LCI’s Bible 
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school). Reinhardt analyses LCI’s discipleship structures as a production line of souls in 
which discipline and lenience acquire various intensities and modes of implementation.  In 
the institutional dynamics described it can be said that, to an extent, discipline contributes to 
transforming selves while lenience is key to the reproduction of the institution within which 
these transformations are supposed to occur. 
 
In line with our concerns about lenience as flexibility, Espirito Santo’s article contributes to a 
theory of fluidity and elasticity in dialogue with debates surrounding self-discipline. In order 
for a particular kind of self to emerge from the practice of Palo Monte, Espirito Santo 
suggests that we should turn away from a Foucauldian understanding of self and body as 
materially self-evident, contained and discrete, proposing instead that we attempt to grasp 
bodies’ heterogeneous historicity in which materiality plays a key part in the workings of 
power. Focusing on Afro-Cuban Palo Monte religion, Espirito-Santo argues that we can, and 
indeed should understand the religious person in a non-essentialist fashion, as an assemblage 
in which in which material components play a critical role in determining the relative 
stability of some persons rather than others. These conditions allow ontologically discrepant 
‘bits’ of the cosmos and the person to become stuck together for particular purposes, leading 
to what some would call ‘synchronicities’. The ritual specialists of Palo Monte can be trained 
into producing these synchronicities in the form of witchcraft, for instance, in which 
coherences are sought between plants, animals, spirit forms, people and their indeterminate 
relations. It is by disciplining elements external to the subject that one finds a fluid or flexible 
sense of self – a sense that is formed and sustained by the inherent flexibility inherent to Palo 
Monte’s tradition.   
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What these combined papers do is to explore the complex dialectics between discipline and 
lenience. They present various registers in which lenience emerges as a counterpart to 
discipline by exploring sharply different ethnographic contexts of religious practice. The 
papers speak collectively to the fact that lenience is not to be understood as opposed to 
discipline but rather as constitutive of it, essential to its very mechanics. This recognition 
provokes us to reconsider, both ethnographically and conceptually, the systemic dimension of 
religious action as well as the centrality of flexibility and lenience in a variety of cultural 
environments, whether these be intricately regimented or loose and unpredictable. Rather 
than discipline it could be lenience – spatial, temporal, ethical, ideational – which allows all 
sorts of systems to endure through time by foregrounding, accommodating, containing or 
transforming the human capacity for inertia, inadequacy and rebellion. 
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